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THE PUZZLE OF THE ACTUAL INJURY
REQUIREMENT FOR DAMAGES
James M. Fischer*
Courts often state that an award of damages should be tied to the
"actual injury" sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's
legal misconduct. The frequency with which the statement is made and
applied, however, may be profitably compared with the numerous
instances when the concept is elided or ignored. This Article examines
a representative sampling of decisions where the actual injury concept
is nominally treated as a rule. The Article argues, however, that courts
have not developed a consistent, coherent approach to applying an
actual injury requirement that would allow it to be called a "rule."
More realistically, it is a generally applied principle that usually
represents an intuitive sense as to when compensatory damages are
appropriate and how much should be awarded.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a staple of judicial remedies discourse that the purpose of a
remedy is restitutio in integrum, which means to place the person in
the position the person would have occupied had the wrong not
occurred.' This rightful position principle is applied with particular
force to awards of damages, which are, after all, tied to the idea that
the plaintiff has suffered an injury for which he should be
* Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School, Los Angeles, California. I would like to
thank Dean Bryant Garth and Southwestern Law School for providing financial assistance in the
form of a summer research stipend that aided immensely in the completion of this Article.
1. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 n.15 (1977) (involving structural injunction and
stating that "the ultimate objective of the remedy is to make whole the victims of unlawful
conduct"); Butler v. German, 822 P.2d 1067, 1069 (Mont. 1991) (involving mandatory
injunction: "[t]he fundamental purpose of any remedy is to return the plaintiff to his or her
rightful position, 'the position or state the party would have attained had the [wrong] not
occurred"') (alteration in original); see also Tracy A. Thomas, Congress' Section 5 Power and
Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673, 725 (2001) (noting that the general purpose of a
remedy is to "return a plaintiff to her rightful position-the position she would have been in but
for the constitutional wrong"); cf Pucino v. Uttley, 785 A.2d 183, 188 (R.I. 2001) (stating that
equitable remedy is appropriate when no adequate legal remedy exists that will restore plaintiff to
the party's rightful position). I do not address in this Article whether this goal is actually attained
by the rules applied or is even consistently attainable other than as an aspirational goal.
198 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:197
compensated.2 Indeed, the connection seems obvious and intuitive.
Yet, it has also provoked and produced disagreement in judicial
decisions.
To say that the person needs to be restored or returned to the
rightful position suggests a positional gap or difference between
where the person presently is and where the person ought to be.
Courts often capture this idea with the term "actual injury," i.e., the
difference between the two positions ("is" versus "ought to be")
represents the person's actual injury. An award of damages equal to
the injury will, thus, place the person in the equivalent position the
person would have been had the wrong not occurred. With the
award, the person's position, from a "balance sheet" perspective, is
the same as if the person had not been injured in the first place.
This approach suggests, however, a converse proposition that
has generated significant dispute. If the person has not sustained
actual injury, is the person's present position the person's rightful
position, at least insofar as an award of damages is concerned?3 In
that situation, judicial intervention is unnecessary because, absent
injury, there is nothing for the law to redress. Consequently, the
person cannot obtain damages. This converse proposition is usually
described in American law as the "actual" injury requirement, and it
has been used in a wide variety of contexts, albeit with much
disagreement, to preclude or limit damages awards.
In this Article, I examine a number of divergent situations when
courts consider the actual injury requirement as a condition to
awarding damages. The situations are diverse, and no common
theme or structure appears that acts as a reconciling principle. This
2. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 15 (3d
ed. 2002) ("[T]he fundamental principle of damages is to restore the injured party as nearly as
possible to the position he would have been in but for the wrong .... ").
3. The concern with actual injury may be muted when other remedies, such as an
injunction, are considered. An injunction, however, requires standing, and actual injury is a
component of the modem test of standing. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-181 (2000). Standing, however, is usually satisfied when the
plaintiff alleges an invasion of a legally protected interest. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). A statute may create a legal right, the invasion of which amounts to
actual injury for purposes of the standing requirement. Korman v. Walking Co., 503 F. Supp. 2d
755, 759 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (involving alleged violation of the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 168 In (2006), an amendment to the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, because defendant provided sales receipt that failed to eliminate specific portions of the
plaintiffs credit card information as required by statute); Ramirez v. MGM Mirage, Inc., 524 F.
Supp. 2d 1226, 1230-31 (D. Nev. 2007) (same).
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suggests that the actual injury requirement operates more as an
instrumental rule that courts use to achieve results they believe are
fair, just, and appropriate under the circumstances.
Before we begin, however, it may be helpful to note a point that
is often ignored, which is whether the actual injury requirement is a
remedy rule or a liability rule. In some cases, e.g., negligence, actual
injury is part of the prima facie cause of action. In other contexts,
the focus is directly on the remedial issue. The Restatement (Second)
of Torts distinguishes between injury (invasion of a legally protected
interest), harm (loss or detriment), and physical harm (impairment of
body or property).' The concepts of injury and harm are, thus, used
in different ways, making context and purpose a critical feature in
comprehending how the specific concept is being used in the
particular instance. The elusiveness of the distinction between injury
as a wrong and injury in the sense of redress can be challenging.'
Chick Hearn, the former play-by-play announcer for the Los
Angeles Lakers, coined a phrase that, I believe, nicely captures the
dilemma: "No harm, no foul."6 Hearn coined the phrase to refer to
contact between players (a foul), which was a rule ("rights")
violation that the referee did not call because the contact did not
interfere with the play and flow of the game.7 Some may argue that
the phrase best captures the concept that absent injury there is no
violation of a right. Others may believe that the proper interpretation
of the phrase is that "no foul" means no referee's whistle, which is
the remedy for the infraction. This illustrates the often blurred
distinction between the notion of no right being violated and no
remedy for the right's violation. This Article collects decisions that
address the issue from both perspectives. As a rule, the distinction is
not expressly addressed by the courts and does not appear to have
directly influenced decisional outcomes.
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (1965).
5. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.1, at 3 n.14, §3.1, at 279 (2d ed. 1993) (noting
the overlap between injury as necessary to a complete cause of action and injury as necessary for
an award of damages pursuant to a cause of action).
6. Linda E. Carter, The Sporting Approach to Harmless Error in Criminal Cases: The
Supreme Court's "No Harm, No Foul" Debacle in Neder v. United States, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L.,
229, 230 n.3 (2001).
7. Id. at 242 n.74.
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II. THE ACTUAL INJURY REQUIREMENT:
SOME EXAMPLES
Often, but with numerous exceptions, courts require that the
plaintiff sustain-and demonstrate that the defendant's misconduct
caused the plaintiff to sustain-actual injury before allowing the
plaintiff to recover damages as a result of the defendant's
misconduct. The list that follows is illustrative of the issue, though it
is neither designed nor intended to represent all of the contexts in
which the law treats actual injury as a condition to a damages award.
A. Actual Injury and Statutory Damages
Modem statutes often specify a statutory damages award when
the statute has been violated.8 A question that courts have grappled
with in this area is whether statutory damages may be awarded solely
on the showing of a statutory violation or whether the award is
conditioned on the further showing that the violation caused actual
injury to the plaintiff.9
Decisions addressing the actual injury requirement for statutory
damages awards all purport to rely on statutory language, but the
decisions do not adopt a consistent approach to the resolution of the
question. In Doe v. Chao,l" a Privacy Act" case involving improper
disclosure of the plaintiffs social security number, the Court held
that the Act's actual injury requirement for compensatory damages
awards also applied to the Act's specific provision mandating a
8. For example, under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n
(2006), an amendment to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, a person who obtains a consumer report
"under false pretenses or knowingly without a permissible purpose" is liable for "actual damages
sustained by the consumer reporting agency or $1,000, whichever is greater" 15 U.S.C. §
1681 n(b) (2006) (emphasis added). A similar result occurs for violations of the Truth in Lending
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2006). Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2006);
Mourning v. Family Publ'ns Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 376-77 (1973); Baker v. G. C. Servs.
Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 780 (9th Cir. 1982); Woolfolk v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 783 F. Supp. 724,
727 n.3 (D. Conn. 1990).
9. If actual injury is required, courts differ as to the nature and type of injury that will
satisfy the requirement. Brian Sheppard, Annotation, Award of Damages Under Privacy Act, 5
US.CA. § 552a, 189 A.L.R. FED. 455 §§ 10-15 (2003) (collecting conflicting decisions as to
whether proof of "actual damages" requires showing economic loss or may be satisfied by
showing of noneconomic loss, e.g., emotional distress).
10. 540 U.S. 614 (2004).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
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minimum $1,000 award for intentional or willful violations of the
Act.'2
The relevant provision of the Privacy Act provides:
In any suit brought... in which the court determines that
the agency acted in a manner which was intentional or
willful, the United States shall be liable to the individual in
an amount equal to the sum of-
(A) actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of
the refusal or failure, but in no case shall a person entitled
to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000 ......
The majority in Chao read the "but in no case" language as a
gloss on the grant of actual damages rather than as an independent,
supplemental remedy. 4
On the other hand, in Kehoe v. Fidelity Federal Bank & Trust,"
a Driver's Privacy Protection Act'6 case involving improper
disclosure of personal information contained on driver's license
records, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff
could recover statutory damages notwithstanding the plaintiffs
failure to show any actual damages resulting from the violation. 7
The relevant provision of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act
provides:
(a) Cause of action. A person who knowingly obtains,
discloses or uses personal information, from a motor
vehicle record, for a purpose not permitted under this
chapter shall be liable to the individual to whom the
information pertains, who may bring a civil action in a
United States district court.
(b) Remedies. The court may award-
12. Id. at 627.
13. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4).
14. 540 U.S. at 620 (2004); cf Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2207 (2007)
(stating that a plaintiff that claims no actual harm could obtain statutory and punitive damages for
a willful violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (§ 168In(a)).
15. 421 F.3d 1209 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1051 (2006). The court noted the
absence of legislative history regarding the question before the court. Id. at 1214 n.4.
16. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-25 (2006); see also Russell v. ChoicePoint Servs., Inc., 300 F. Supp.
2d 450 (E.D. La. 2004) (holding that Driver's Privacy Protection Act claim could not be stated
absent a showing of"impermissible use" of the protected personal information).
17. Kehoe, 421 F.3dat 1217.
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(1) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in
the amount of $2,500.... ."
In contradistinction to Chao the court treated the "but not less than"
language not as a gloss on actual damages, but as an independent,
supplemental remedy.' 9
The different approaches of the above two decisions are of
interest. First, in Chao the Court emphasized the placement of the
statutory damages allowance in the same sentence as the allowance
for recovery of actual damages, 0 while in Kehoe that fact was
disregarded. Second, in Chao the Court noted that allowing recovery
of statutory damages without proof of actual damages would amount
to recognition of presumed damages, t but in Kehoe the Eleventh
Circuit noted that damages for violation of the right of privacy are a
"quintessential example of damages that, are uncertain and possibly
unmeasurable."22 Third, the Court in Chao saw a natural fit between
the allowance of actual damages and the mandatory statutory
minimum award.23 The Eleventh Circuit in Kehoe, on the other hand,
found that the dissimilarity between the terms "actual damages" and
"liquidated damages" suggested that the remedies were separate and
independent rather than interconnected.24 Lastly, the Court in Chao
rejected reliance on other privacy statutes to glean whether the "but
no less than" language should be limited to cases when the plaintiff
proved some actual damages.25 In contrast, the Kehoe court found
that Congress's use of similar (or dissimilar) language in other
privacy statutes was of significance in determining the meaning of
the Driver's Privacy Protection Act issue before the court.26
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2724 (2006).
19. 421 F.3dat 1215.
20. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 622-23 (2004).
21. Id. (rejecting inclusion of "presumed damages" gloss of Privacy Act violations because
legislative history indicates that Congress, in enacting the Privacy Act, deferred the issue for
further study by the Privacy Protection Study Commission). While the Commission subsequently
recommended such an approach, Congress has not enacted the Commission's recommendation
into law. Id.
22. 421 F.3d at 1213 (noting that uncertainty as to the measurement of actual damages is a
reason for relying on liquidated damages).
23. 540U.S.at621.
24. 421 F.3dat 1213.
25. 540 U.S. at 626-27.
26. 421 F.3d at 1215-16. There are sufficient differences between Doe v. Chao and Kehoe
v. Fidelity Bank that a plausible claim can be made (as it was made in Kehoe) that Kehoe is not
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B. Actual Injury & Liquidated Damages
The decisions are in conflict as to whether a contractual
liquidated damages provision is enforceable when the plaintiff has
not sustained actual injury as a result of the defendant's breach of
performance obligations assumed under the contract.27 The conflict
nominally arises out of two distinct views regarding the role of
courts in enforcing liquidated damages provisions. One view holds
that the parties' intent should control. When the parties consensually
agree that upon breach, the non-breaching party may claim liquidated
damages rather than actual damages, the parties' contractual
intentions should be respected.28  The contrary view holds that the
parties' contractual intent must be measured against the implied
assumption that the purpose of a liquidated damages provision is an
alternative measure of plaintiff's damages. If the plaintiff has not
sustained any damage, the necessary condition for the award of
damages does not exist.29
inconsistent with Doe. The Kehoe court went to some lengths to distinguish Chao. Id. at 1214-
15. Moreover, a petition for certiorari was denied. Fid. Fed. Bank & Trust v. Kehoe, 547 U.S.
1051 (2006). Yet, for all the distinctions, there remains an aspect of Kehoe that is interesting, the
use of the term "liquidated" to distinguish Chao and avoid its approach as a proper resolution of
the question.
The Kehoe court treated liquidated damages as a substitute for an award of compensatory
damages. 421 F.3d at 1213 (noting that "liquidated damages are a contractual substitute for
actual damages") (citation omitted). The court relied on decisions involving liquidated damages
provisions in bargain settings between private parties. The court cited no authority for giving the
term "liquidated damages" the same construction in the legislative context as it received in the
private context, aside from the assertion that "Congress's decision to use the technical term
'liquidated damages' in the DPPA suggests that it intended to incorporate the locution's well-
understood meaning." Id. at 1215 n.5 (citation omitted); see infra notes 27-31 and accompanying
text.
The traditional understanding of the term "liquidated" is "fixed" or "certain." The Kehoe
court chose to focus on the phrase "liquidated damages" rather than the term "liquidated"
damages to distinguish its case from Chao. Ironically, the original usage of the phrase
"liquidated damages" was to "settle and clarify." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1012 (2d ed.
1991). Neither of which seems to have been accomplished.
27. 3 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 12.9(2), at 250; JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING
REMEDIES § 17.2 (2d ed. 2006); see Gregory Scott Crespi, Measuring "Actual Harm "for the
Purpose of Determining the Enforceability of Liquidated Damages Clauses, 41 HOUS. L. REv.
1579 (2005).
28. See Colonial at Lynnfield, Inc. v. Sloan, 870 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1989); Wallace Real
Estate Inv., Inc. v. Groves, 881 P.2d 1010, 1015-16 (Wash. 1994).
29. See Hubbard Bus. Plaza v. Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. Co., 649 F. Supp. 1310, 1316 (D.
Nev. 1986), af'd, 844 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1988); Vines v. Orchard Hills, Inc., 435 A.2d 1022
(Conn. 1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1), cmt. b (1965) (tying actual
injury to contexts when a substantial sum is provided for as liquidated damages); cf Atel Fin.
Corp. v. Quaker Coal Co., 321 F.3d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that, under California law,
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Closely tied to this issue is the extent to which, if at all, a court
would treat the actual damage requirement as subject to contract
modification by the parties.3" Liquidated damages provisions
expressly purporting to dispense with an actual injury requirement
have not been considered by the courts. Permitting the parties to
contract around an actual damage requirement would be consistent
with the view that the parties' intent should control. On the other
hand, rejecting an actual injury requirement would increase the risk
that the liquidated damages provision was a disguised penalty clause,
which courts will not enforce.3'
C. Actual Injury & Potential Injury
Can a person receive compensation for an injury that is
foreseeable but not yet experienced? Courts have traditionally said
no, unless the person can show that the wrongdoer's actions would
more likely than not result in the person's future actual injury.32
Even here, the future injury rule is generally limited to bodily injury
claims. If the future loss is a personal injury, e.g., reputational injury
or injury to privacy interest, the person has to wait until the
apprehended harm is actually realized before he can seek
compensation (damages) for his losses.
when a liquidated damages clause was written so that it was triggered by "loss of a bargain upon
the occurrence of an event of default," a liquidated damages provision was not activated when the
non-breaching party was reimbursed for its losses occasioned by the breach). See generally
RICHARD A. LORD, 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 65:33 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the
necessity of establishing actual harm or damages).
30. Cf AFLAC, Inc. v. Williams, 444 S.E.2d 314, 317 (Ga. 1994) (holding that liquidated
damages provision that failed to include non-breaching party's duty to mitigate evidenced that
provision was a penalty, rendering provision unenforceable); Browning-Ferris Indus. of
Nebraska, Inc. v. Eating Establishment-90th & Fort, Inc., 575 N.W.2d 885, 890 (Neb. Ct. App.
1998) (stating that "a contracting party [cannot] negate the general duty to mitigate damages by
merely inserting a liquidated damages provision in a contract"); Crespi, supra note 27, at 1590
(arguing that actual injury should not include mitigatable losses because "the inclusion of those
damages in actual harm or actual loss when reviewing enforceability would create perverse
incentives for the injured party that could encourage economic waste").
31. Truck Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Puritan Farms 2nd, Inc., 361 N.E.2d 1015, 1018 (N.Y.
1977) (stating that enforcement of liquidated damages provision that was actually a penalty clause
"would lead to the most terrible oppression in pecuniary dealings") (citation omitted).
32. FISCHER, supra note 27, §§ 9.1-9.2 (discussing single, lump sum award principle and
requirement that future loss must be reasonably probable or certain to occur before compensation
for that future loss may be awarded); see generally David Carl Minneman, Annotation, Future
Disease or Condition, or Anxiety Relating Thereto, As Element of Recovery, 50 A.L.R. 4TH 13
(1986) (discussing approaches and collecting authorities).
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Recently, however, some courts have become more lenient in
permitting a recovery for apprehended risk, dispensing with the
traditional limitations of the preponderance of the evidence standard
and the limitation of the ability to recover future injury to bodily
injury claims. Two examples of this development are (1) medical
monitoring and (2) preventive measures to avoid imminent loss.33
1. Medical Monitoring
An award of damages for medical monitoring represents the cost
to the person of medical procedures so that the person may determine
if she has contracted a disease or ailment. In the typical case, a
wrongdoer has exposed a person to a risk of injury, but the person
cannot show she is more likely than not to sustain actual injury.
Medical monitoring permits that person to more quickly determine if
and when she is injured. Medical monitoring costs are separate and
independent of any damages award the person, as a plaintiff, would
receive if she were actually injured as a result of the wrongdoer's
conduct.34 Medical monitoring is, thus, the converse of the typical
injury case when the plaintiff recovers medical expense caused by
her injury. In the medical monitoring context, the expense precedes
the injury.35 Jurisdictions vary in their willingness to recognize
recoveries in this area36 and the recovery thresholds when they do.37
33. These examples are not exclusive, but represent part of a larger trend to compensate
persons whose risk of encountering harm is enhanced by the conduct of others. See John C.P.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REv. 1625 (2002).
34. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 823 (Cal. 1993); see 2 DOBBS,
supra note 5, § 8.1(3), at 380.
35. 2 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 8.1(3), at 379-81; FISCHER, supra note 27, § 72.4 (discussing
medical monitoring recoveries). Some courts finesse the issue by treating the award as ancillary
to the issuance of an injunction ordering the defendant to provide medical monitoring. Id. § 8.10,
at 539-40; see Richard Bourne, Medical Monitoring Without Physical Injury: The Least Justice
Can Do for Those Industry Has Terrorized with Poisonous Products, 58 SMU L. REV. 251, 257
(2005) (arguing that courts should provide equitable relief, but not damages, by compelling
defendants to pay for future medical monitoring to address the increased risk of future bodily
injury caused by defendants' activities).
36. See Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 183 P.3d 181, 187 (Or. 2008) (holding that a
plaintiff who alleged that her exposure to defendant's products significantly increased the risk
that she would contract lung cancer but who did not allege present physical effect from exposure
nor reasonable probability of future harm could not state a claim for recovery of costs of medical
monitoring).
37. See Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Mich. 2005) (rejecting medical
monitoring absent an allegation of a present physical injury). Compare Redland Soccer Club,
Inc. v. Dep't of the Army, 696 A.2d 137, 145 (Pa. 1997) (adopting "significantly increased risk of
contracting a serious latent disease" standard), with Abusio v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc.,
Fall 2008]
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2. Measures to Prevent Imminent Loss
Traditionally, courts have distinguished between pre-injury
preventive measures and post-injury ameliorative measures. The law
of mitigation of damages not only encouraged, but often required
post-injury amelioration.3" Pre-injury preventive remedial measures,
however, stood on a different footing. Unless the victim contributed
to his losses by acting negligently, e.g., engaging in contributory
negligence or comparative fault, the victim's pre-injury acts or
omissions were not legally relevant to the assessment of damages.39
The general liability rule was that a person did not have a duty to
apprehend that the tortfeasor may breach a duty of care owed to
him.4" Consequently, he was not required to engage in activities to
avoid the risk of injury posed by a possible tortfeasor. Because there
was no duty to act, a person who expended funds to avoid or mitigate
656 N.Y.S.2d 371, 372 (App. Div. 1997) (adopting a rational basis test). See generally 2 STEIN
ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 7:31 (3d ed. 1997) (collecting decisions allowing medical
monitoring recoveries); Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Recovery of Damages for Expense of
Medical Monitoring to Detect or Prevent Future Disease or Condition, 17 A.L.R. 5TH 327 (1994)
(discussing approaches and collecting authorities).
38. FISCHER, supra note 27, § 13 (discussing the mitigation of damages requirement). The
mitigation requirement may also be seen as an extension of a view of remedies that emphasizes
redress by the least costly means to achieve restoration to the rightful position. See Richard
Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 735
(2006) (giving least cost avoidance as one of several reasons for the adoption of the economic
loss rule). Professor Posner argues:
The upshot of this analysis is that efficiency may be promoted by shifting the legal
responsibility for an accident from the injurer to the victim. This is simply
generalizing to tort law the contract-law rule of Hadley v. Baxendale; and indeed I did
this many years ago in a case called Evra, which was much like Hadley except that
there was no contractual relation between injurer and victim. The point in Hadley...
was that the carrier could not estimate the loss that the customer would incur from a
delay in the delivery of the repaired mill shaft to the customer, but the customer could
estimate this cost and, therefore, was in a better position to avoid the loss by taking
appropriate precautions or by buying insurance. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 739; see also I DOBBS, supra note 5, § 3.9, at 380-86 (discussing the mitigation
requirement).
39. The distinction between pre-injury and post-injury duties leads to some interesting
classification issues. For example, does the plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt or safety
equipment, which results in an exacerbation of his injuries but does not cause or contribute to the
injury itself, constitute preinjury contributory negligence or postinjury failure to mitigate
damages? LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 125-26 (discussing the issue).
40. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 33, at 170-72 (4th ed.
1971) (stating that a reasonable person may assume that others will act reasonably under the
circumstances, but that a reasonable person may not act indifferently to obvious risks); cf
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C (1965) (stating that a person who proceeds with
knowing appreciation of the risk may be deemed to have impliedly assumed the risk of loss).
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the harm that would accrue, if a tortfeasor breached the duty of care,
was without a remedy for the cost he voluntarily incurred to avoid
that apprehended harm from occurring.4
Emerging case law, however, has relaxed the actual injury
requirement when there is a reasonable likelihood of bodily injury or
property damage unless mitigative efforts are undertaken. The usual
situation involves a person whose product or conduct poses a risk of
actual injury to the plaintiff or to third parties, rather than the case in
medical monitoring in which the risk is solely to the plaintiff. For
example, an automotive defect may create a serious risk of injury to
passengers if the vehicle is involved in a collision.42 Similarly, a
building may have been negligently designed or constructed so that it
poses a risk of danger to inhabitants or passersby if it collapses.43
Although the decisions are few, courts .are increasingly receptive to
the view that public policy should encourage immediate repair to
prevent the risk of future injury even though the plaintiff does not
meet the usual predicate for recovery (actual bodily injury or
property damage).
D. Actual Injury & Injury Thresholds
One way to finesse or minimize the actual injury requirement is
to set a low threshold for its satisfaction. For example, both injury at
the chromosomal level and the thickening of body tissue have been
deemed bodily injury.4 4 This approach has also been used to satisfy
41. An action to avoid the defendant's unjust enrichment might be possible. The claim
would be for the money the defendant saved by not taking reasonable precautions to avoid the
risk of harm to the victim. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §
21 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) (A "[s]aved expenditure is no less a benefit than cash in
hand .. "); LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 598-600 (discussing use of restitution to recover the
benefit derived by defendant from not spending money to prevent unreasonable risk or injury to
others).
42. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 916 A.2d 257 (Md. 2007) (collecting decisions).
Lloyd involves an allegedly defectively designed front seat that could collapse in a collision
causing injury to the person sitting in the seat and any person behind him. Id. at 262
43. See, e.g., Winnipeg Condo. Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Constr. Co., [1995] 1 S.C.R. 85 (Can.)
(involving metal separating from a high-rise building and falling to the ground).
44. See Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 81 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that pleural
thickening of lung tissue satisfies bodily injury requirement); Werlein v. United States, 746
F.Supp. 887, 901 (D. Minn. 1990) (holding that subcellular injuries could satisfy the bodily injury
requirement to permit recovery of medical monitoring costs). But see Burns v. Jaquays Minning
Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 31 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting subclinical cellular injury as satisfying
bodily injury requirement). All of these cases involve the interpretation of the term "bodily
injury" under general liability policies. General liability insurance policies typically require the
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the impact requirement to recover for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress.45 Similarly, courts have deemed the initial
incorporation of a defective product into another product to amount
to property damage to the latter, even though the product as a whole
remains serviceable.46 There is some tension here between these low
threshold cases and the old adage de minimis non curat lex (the law
does not concern itself with trifles), 47 but the tendency appears to be
to favor compensation.
E. Actual Injury & Injury Characterization
1. Economic Measurement
If a person negligently impacts another's property, may the
owner recover the full cost of repair if the repair cost is greater than
the difference in value before and after the impact? Assume the pre-
impact market value of the property is $100; the post-impact market
value is $100 (because the impact inflicted only minor cosmetic
damage that did not affect the property's utility); but the cost of
repairing the cosmetic damage caused by the impact is $50.
4
1
occurrence of bodily injury within the policy period to trigger coverage obligations on the part of
the insurer. ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW
§ 65(c)(2)(i) (4th ed. 2007).
45. Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F.Supp. 1219, 1226-27 (D. Mass. 1986) (treating
subcellular, chromosomal harm as satisfying the physical harm requirement for recovering
negligently inflicted emotional distress damages).
46. Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 805, 807 (7th Cir. 1992)
(characterizing defective products as ticking time bombs). Contra Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Eljer
Mfg., Inc., 757 N.E.2d 481, 498-99 (Ill. 2001) (rejecting incorporation as damage theory). See
generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Strict Products Liability: Recovery for Damage to Product
Alone, 72 A.L.R. 4TH 12 (1989) (noting split in decisions and collecting authorities); 63B
AM.JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1923 (2008) (collecting decisions treating incorporated product
and product into which the former is incorporated as a single product and therefore rejecting the
claim that damage to other property occurred). The finding of damage to other property is often
critical to avoiding the economic loss rule. FISCHER, supra note 27, § 11.2.
47. Brandt v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 480 F.3d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that courts
have applied the adage generally).
48. Hewlett v. Barge Bertie, 418 F.2d 654 (4th Cir. 1969). In Hewlett, a barge that was in a
dilapidated but usable state was cosmetically injured by defendant. Plaintiff sought cost of repair
damages, i.e., the amount of money it would require to fix the minor dents in the barge. Id. at
656. As a practical matter, the injury did not lessen the economic value of the barge or interfere
with the use to which it was being put, and was capable of being put, at the time of the collision.
Id. at 657. The court allowed the cost of repair damages. Id. at 657-58. The court commented at
several points that the defendant failed to establish that diminution in value was less than cost of
repair, id., which would support the use of cost of repair as the measure of diminution in value.
FISCHER, supra note 27, § 7.3. The dissent thought the point evident:
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Allowing a recovery in excess of the property's diminution in
value suggests that the proper characterization of the rightful position
is that the owner is entitled to have property free of the cosmetic
damage even though her position (from a "balance sheet"
perspective) has not changed. Before the impact, the owner had
property free of cosmetic damage worth $100; after the impact, the
owner has property worth $100 with cosmetic damage. The owner's
position is impaired from an aesthetic point of view but not from an
economic point of view. Should that difference matter? Does
restoring the owner to her original, pre-impact position mean that her
property should not have cosmetic damage? The great majority of
courts do not permit an award of cost-of-repair damages in this
context. Courts distinguish between "harm" and "legal harm."
Sustaining a cosmetic defect to one's property may constitute harm
in the everyday sense of the term, but it does not constitute legal
harm (actual injury) as courts require to support an award of
damages. Most courts would see the owner's position as being
unchanged by the impact. Before the impact, the owner's property
was worth $100; after the impact, the property is still worth $100.
Chick Hearn's phrase "No harm, no foul" is here merely an inversion
of the legal maxim "For every wrong, there is a remedy." Unless the
referee (judge) blows the whistle, the misconduct is not classified as
a wrong. Therefore, no remedy is provided.49  To use the
nomenclature of the Restatement, one may suffer an injury (invasion
of a legal right), but that invasion may not result in harm (loss or
detriment)."
If my brothers are right, the libellant is unduly enriched. He must hope greatly that
another errant navigator will hit his battered barge again, and still another yet again, so
that each time he may happily pocket the estimated cost of theoretical repairs which
neither he nor anyone else will ever dream of undertaking while retaining all along a
barge as seaworthy and useful to him and of undiminished worth if he chooses to sell
it.
Hewlett, 418 F.2d at 661; see also t DOBBS, supra note 5, § 5.13(1) (discussing measure of
recovery when personal property is damaged, but not destroyed).
49. Ex parte Mountain Top Indoor Flea Mkt., Inc., 699 So. 2d 158, 161 (Ala. 1997) ("[Tlhe
law doesn't say for every injury there is a remedy. It says for every wrong there is a remedy.")
(citation omitted).
50. See supra text accompanying note 3.
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2. Economic Actuality
The actual injury determination is often affected by the presence
of collateral payments, the receipt of which may negate a claim that
harm was sustained. A simple case may be when a contractor
damages a support beam while installing it. An injury has occurred
because the support beam is damaged. In the usual case, however,
the contractor simply redoes the work with no delay in completing
the project and no increase in the price. This is a good example of
"No harm, no foul" in every sense of the phrase.
What happens, however, if we alter the situation? Patient
receives medical treatment from Physician for her injuries caused by
Tortfeasor. Physician would normally charge $500, a reasonable
amount, for the treatment. However, because Patient is a member of
a Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO") that has contracted
with Physician, Physician agrees to accept $250 as full payment for
the treatment.5' In defining Patient's actual injury, which is here the
medical expense, Patient received treatment reasonably and
objectively worth $500, but Physician, who provided the treatment,
agreed to accept from the HMO $250 as payment in full. Should we
treat the injury as worth $500 or $250? Jurisdictions have split over
this issue. 2
3. Decision Timing
A determination about whether a person has sustained actual
injury may depend on the time when the determination is made.
Consider, for example, the case of Owner whose house has been
condemned and will be razed to build a highway. Before Owner
receives the condemnation award and while he still has title, the
house is destroyed through the negligence of Tortfeasor. Has Owner
sustained an actual injury that he may recover from his insurer? In
51. To simplify the issue, I make two assumptions. First, we can exclude Patient's fees to
the Health Maintenance Organization and any co-pays Patient must provide when obtaining the
treatment. Second, we can assume that the Health Maintenance Organization will not seek to
recover the difference between Physician's usual rate and the contract rate from any person
involved in the hypothetical.
52. FISCHER, supra note 27, § 72.2 (discussing split in authorities as to proper measure of
medical expense loss when a physician agrees to accept a discount from the amount billed to a
patient as full satisfaction of the billing); see Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847 (II1. 2005)
(permitting plaintiff to introduce billed amount of medical expenses as evidence of "reasonable
value" of medical expenses incurred, rather than amount actually paid for medical services
rendered; however, plaintiff could not testify that total billed amount was paid).
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one sense, Owner has a destroyed house. In another sense, however,
no actual injury has occurred because Owner's interest in the house
has been transmuted into the condemnation award. Jurisdictions
have disagreed over which viewpoint should control. 3  One
viewpoint holds that the matter is viewed solely as between the
insurer and the policyholder. 4 The contrary view holds that the court
should look at the substance of the whole transaction, including acts
of third parties, to determine whether an actual loss occurred.5
We can vary the facts slightly to further illustrate the problem.
Assume the house is destroyed by an Act of God rather than third-
party negligence. Should the insurer's obligation to pay property
damage be excused because the owner/insured's interest has been
transmuted into the condemnation award? Should the question of
actual injury be treated differently depending on whether the payor is
a negligent tortfeasor or an insurer? Again, jurisdictions are split. 6
The issue of timing and the existence of actual injury can arise
in other contexts. For example, should a bankruptcy discharge affect
53. See Royal Ins. Co. v. Sisters of Presentation, 430 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1970), for a
discussion on whether a Sisterhood could assert a property damage claim under roughly similar
facts. The convent in which the Sisterhood resided was condemned as unfit for human habitation,
so the local bishop agreed to exchange an adjoining property upon which a new convent was to be
built. Id. at 760. Before the demolition of the old convent was complete, the old convent was
destroyed by fire. Id. Although the court's decision focused on the legal issue of whether under
the circumstances the Sisterhood had an "insurable interest" in the old convent, the court made
several comments pertinent to the actual injury inquiry:
The trial court waved aside the fact that the new convent had been received and
occupied by the Sisters, referring to it as a 'collateral benefit' that could have no effect
on the supposed insurance obligation. The court cited Hughes v. Potomac Ins. Co., for
this proposition. The 'collateral benefit' rule deals with nothing more than the effect of
overlapping indemnities for a particular loss. Hughes and the cases therein cited
simply hold that an insurer is liable for the full loss despite the fact that
indemification after the loss was made by a third party. In contrast, the new convent
built by the Bishop in the present case did not operate to relieve the Sisters from a loss,
but instead was only one element or transactions which, as a whole, prevented the
Sisters from suffering any loss in the first place.
Id. at 762-63 (citation omitted); see also LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, 3 COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 41:13 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing effect of condemnation proceedings and award on
ability of owner/condemnee to recover on insurance policy covering condemned property when
property is lost or damaged).
54. Alexandra Rest. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 71 N.Y.S.2d 515, 521 (App. Div. 1947), ajfd, 79
N.E.2d 268 (N.Y. 1948).
55. Ramsdell v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 221 N.W. 654 (Wis. 1928). See Citizens Ins. Co. v.
Foxbilt, Inc., 226 F.2d 641, 644 (8th Cir. 1955) (discussing split in authorities).
56. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 44, § 46(b) (discussing decisions and noting the
split in authorities); see also Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 53, § 41:13 (same).
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the trustee's assertion of a legal malpractice claim against the
attorney whose neglect caused the discharged claim to be entered
against the bankrupt person in the first place? In one sense, a harm
occurred-the attorney's neglect led to a judgment against the client
(the bankrupt person). On the other hand, an intervening event (the
client's bankruptcy) dissipated that event of its economic
significance. Which viewpoint should control?57
As one last example, assume Pam has a five-year contract to
clean a high-rise office building. Dan tortiously induces the owner
of the building to breach Pam's contract and hire Dan to perform the
services. Pam sues Dan for tortious interference. However, while
the suit is pending and while four years remain on Pam's contract
with Owner, the building is destroyed, a fact that would operate to
terminate Pam's contract with Owner. Assume further that the court
concludes Dan tortiously interfered with Pam's contract rights. What
is Pam's actual injury? Is it the five years that she expected the
contract to be in force or the one year it actually was in force before
the building was destroyed? In other words, should the court define
"actual" injury based on what the world looked like at the time of
tortious interference (ex ante) or at the time of trial when the injury is
to be quantified (ex post)?58
F. Actual Injury & Claim Validation
The law may recognize certain actions as being wrongful and
certain consequences as being foreseeable, yet because of validation
concerns it may still exhibit hesitancy over recognizing a right of
recovery in situations satisfying both criteria.
57. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, 3 LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 25:7, at 804
(4th ed. 2008); see generally David Gray Carlson, Indemnity Liability, Insolvency, 25 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1951 (2004) (discussing the distinction between indemnity and liability in context of
insolvency such as bankruptcy proceedings).
58. See 3 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 12.19(1), at 434-35 (discussing whether date of breach or
events subsequent to breach should be measure of loss); Konrad Bonsack, Damages Assessment,
Janis Joplin's Yearbook, and the Pie-Powder Court, 13 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1 (1990)
(discussing whether the goal of compensatory damages is to restore the plaintiff to his rightful
position based on the facts as they existed as of the date of the wrongdoing or as of the date of
trial); Mark Glick & Avner Kalay, How to Value a Lost Opportunity: A Real Options Approach,
11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 677-81 (2003) (arguing that preference for ex ante approach
marginalizes a person's desire to choose to be a risk taker by forcing the person to accept a risk-
neutral recovery).
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1. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
The nimbleness of negligence and emotional distress to
encompass myriad situations and the lack of objective measures of
thresholds (or limits) for each concept have caused jurisdictions to
pause before allowing recovery of distress damages for simple
negligence (e.g., negligent infliction of emotional distress
("NIED")).59 Generally, jurisdictions require some corroborating
fact that lends genuineness to the NIED claim. When a person
sustains actual bodily injury or is physically proximate to an
identifiable risk of bodily injury (zone of danger), there are objective
criteria that validate the genuineness of the claim. When these
factors are absent, jurisdictions may rely on foreseeability concepts
or pre-set criteria to distinguish actionable from non-actionable
claims. In this latter context, however, courts often couple the NIED
action with another validation corollary: physical manifestation of
injury.6" It is not sufficient for plaintiff to claim and describe her
defendant-induced distress; rather, the plaintiff must show that her
distress had an observable physical manifestation, e.g., vomiting,
insomnia, or headaches, and that the physical manifestations of
distress were long-lasting, rather than merely transitory.6' Here, the
actual injury requirement-in the guise of the physical manifestation
rule-exists not as the basis for the award, which is the usual
justification under the rightful position thesis, but as corroboration or
necessary evidence that the plaintiffs claimed injuries are genuine
and deserve compensation.
2. Rescission
For a damages claim based on the plaintiff's decision to stand on
the bargain, a court may inquire whether the plaintiff's affirmance of
the bargain should permit him to seek expectancy losses. How
59. 2 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 8.3(5); FISCHER, supra note 27, § 12; see Bourne, supra note
35, at 261-66 (discussing the limited success plaintiffs have achieved in seeking recovery based
on NIED in the context of "exposure cases").
60. Bourne, supra note 35, at 261-66 (collecting decisions).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. c (1965) (characterizing certain
manifestations of emotional distress, such as fright, nausea, and rage, as insufficient to satisfy the
"physical manifestation" requirement necessary to recover distress damages negligently inflicted
on the plaintiff, as compared to distress that results in a more serious injury, such as a
miscarriage); cf Boume, supra note 35, at 266 (arguing that greater success of medical
monitoring theory of recovery over NIED in context of exposure cases is due, in part, to
concreteness and objectiveness of medical monitoring; the injury is defined as economic).
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should injury be defined when the plaintiff claims the bargain
benefits, but further claims that he has not received all he is entitled
to receive? One function of equating actual injury with economic
loss is to provide some degree of certainty as to the consequences of
breach insofar as a potential damages award is concerned, i.e., that
the breach resulted in actual losses to the plaintiff. This type of
certainty has been highly valued in American law and is reflected in
the general requirement that the plaintiff establish the amount of any
general damages he claims and that he establish both the actuality
and the amount of any special or consequential damages he claims.62
If, however, the plaintiff chooses to disaffirm the bargain as a
result of the defendant's breach, the need for limiting actual injury to
realized economic losses dissipates. There is no concern that the
plaintiff is receiving more or less than he contracted for or lost due to
difficulty in measuring contract expectancies or consequences of
breach. The remedy of rescission restores to each party the
consideration he had given when entering into the bargain. Concerns
that plaintiff might possibly exploit the relationship by disaffirming
the bargain are ameliorated by the requirement for disaffirmance
(rescission) that the breach be substantial,63 or that other grounds for
rescission exist that justify undoing the bargain and restoring the
62. Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of Am., 701 P.2d 826, 836 (Cal. 1985) (holding that to recover
lost profits for breach of contract the evidence must affirmatively show "with reasonable certainty
both their occurrence and the extent thereof') (citation omitted); see Wooton v. Viking Distrib.
Co., Inc., 899 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that the evidence must show both the
existence of loss and the amount of the loss). In Kenford Co., Inc. v. County of Erie, 493 N.E.2d
234 (N.Y. 1986), the court commented:
Loss of future profits as damages for breach of contract have been permitted in New
York under long-established and precise rules of law. First, it must be demonstrated
with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the
alleged loss must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words, the
damages may not be merely speculative, possible or imaginary, but must be reasonably
certain and directly traceable to the breach, not remote or the result of other intervening
causes.
Id. at 235 (citation omitted). Lost profits (special damages) are different from benefit-of-the-
bargain damages (general damages). The difference between special and general damages can be
quite contentious as a matter of classification. See 3 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 12.2.3; LAYCOCK,
supra note 2, at 57-61; DOUG RENDLEMAN, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 537-39 (7th ed.
2006).
63. This is not to say that exploitation is nonexistent. The buyer may threaten rescission to
induce a price concession by the defendant. However, this exploitation is inherent in all contexts
in which litigation is possible.
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parties to their prebargain status.' These requirements provide a
somewhat objective standard and are bolstered by the fact that the
plaintiffs legal theory is that he does not want the bargain benefits.
In this context, the actual injury requirement is satisfied by the fact
that the plaintiff was wrongfully induced to enter the bargain.65
The above considerations lessen the threshold for actual injury
when the plaintiff rescinds the bargain. The very act of seeking
rescission corroborates that the defendant's misconduct actually
injured the plaintiff in the sense that the plaintiff did not receive that
for which he bargained. The absence of a meaningful actual injury
requirement for rescission may explain some of the constraints courts
have imposed,66 or sought to impose," on the availability of the
remedy.
3. Fraud
The recovery of damages under a claim of common law fraud is
often dependent on a showing of actual loss resulting from the fraud,
although some courts have dispensed with the requirement.68 There
are two measures of general fraud damages: out-of-pocket and
benefit-of-the-bargain. Under the out-of-pocket measure, the
defrauded party recovers the difference between the value parted
with (usually the consideration) and the value received. Under the
benefit-of-the-bargain measure, the defrauded party recovers the
difference between that which the party would have received had the
64. FISCHER, supra note 27, § 136 (noting that rescission of a bargain is usually limited to
situations in which the rescinding party can show fraud, duress, substantial (material) breach, or
mistake going to the basis of the bargain).
65. The inducement to enter into a bargain need not be morally wrongful to permit a party to
escape; mistake is a ground for rescission. Dairyland Power Coop. v. United States, 16 F.3d
1197, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Wellman Sav. Bank v. Adams, 454 N.W.2d 852, 855 (Iowa 1990).
66. A plaintiff may elect to rescind because rescission is a better remedy than affirmance.
The law of rescission is largely oriented around the theme of not permitting the plaintiff to obtain
rescission or of conditioning its availability to prevent unfairness to the defendant, particularly
when the defendant is not a wrongdoer; nonetheless, rescission is available. FISCHER, supra note
27, § 132.1 (discussing notice requirement), §132.2 (discussing tender requirement), § 133
(discussing election doctrine).
67. Earl v. Saks & Co., 226 P.2d 340, 346 (Cal. 1951) (rejecting pecuniary loss requirement
that lower courts had imposed as condition to rescission of bargain or contract for
misrepresentation); see 2 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 9.3(2), at 581 (stating that the restitutionary
nature of rescission supports nonrecognition of actual damages requirement).
68. FISCHER, supra note 27, § 122.3; 2 DOBBS, supra note 5, §§ 9.2(1), 9.2(4), particularly
9.3(2) ("The ordinary rule is that the plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of actual damages
to have a common law action for damages based on misrepresentation.") (citation omitted).
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representation(s) been true and the value of what was actually
received.69 Jurisdictions that apply the out-of-pocket measure of
fraud damages may compress the measure of damages with the fact
of damage. For example, a plaintiff who is fraudulently induced to
purchase property suffers no injury under the out-of-pocket measure
if the property is worth what the plaintiff paid for it. The out-of-
pocket measure more faithfully follows the principle of restitutio in
integrum, while the competing benefit-of-the-bargain measure more
faithfully tracks contract-based expectancies. 7' The type of measure
a jurisdiction adopts reflects that jurisdiction's view as to what harms
the law of fraud is designed to prevent-out-of-pocket economic loss
or fraudulently induced expectations.
4. Defamation and Disparagement
The law of defamation has traditionally allowed a plaintiff to
recover presumed damages, although this principle has been
significantly restricted recently due to First Amendment free speech
concerns.7' At common law, the plaintiff was required to establish
an injury in the sense that the published material tended to injure the
plaintiffs reputation. Consequently, the allowance of presumed
damages was more in the nature of a substitute for the quantification
of the loss rather than the actuality of loss.
72
69. FISCHER, supra note 27, § 122.1; 2 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 9.2(1), at 551-52.
70. This is not to denigrate or take sides in the debate of whether lost expectancies are actual
losses. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 12.8, at 757-58 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing
argument for recovery of expectancies); FISCHER, supra note 27, § 6.1 (same).
71. FISCHER, supra note 27, § 105; 2 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 7.2(4).
72. PROSSER, supra note 40, § 111, at 739 ("Defamation is rather that which tends to injure
'reputation' in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in
which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions
against him.") (citation omitted). This distinction is somewhat blurred in the constitutionalization
of the cause of action. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) ("The common law
of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory
damages without evidence of actual loss. Under the traditional rules pertaining to actions for
libel, the existence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication."). The Restatement
(Second) of Torts puts forth the following caveat:
The Institute takes no position on whether the traditional common law rule allowing
recovery in the absence of proof of actual harm, for the harm that normally results from
such a defamation, may constitutionally be applied if the defendant knew of the falsity
of the communication or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.
Id. § 621 caveat (1977). These statements are ambiguous as to whether the presumed damages
doctrine substitutes for proof of actual injury (damage) or as a substitute for proof of compensable
injury presumed from the publication of the defamatory statement (damages).
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In some instances, courts require the plaintiff to allege and
establish actual pecuniary loss as a condition to recognition that she
has been defamed. Unless the defamatory meaning of the
publication is clear, in which case presumed damages are permitted,
the plaintiff has to show that she has sustained special damages
flowing from the alleged defamatory statement(s)., This "special
damages" requirement is also the rule insofar as product
disparagement claims are concerned-the plaintiff must show an
actual, pecuniary loss as part of the prima facie case for product
disparagement. 4
5. Trespass to Chattels
A plaintiff must establish that the defendant's wrongful intrusion
into the plaintiffs ownership and possessory interests in personal
property has resulted in actual, pecuniary loss before the plaintiff
may maintain an action for trespass to chattels.75
6. Constitutional Torts/Civil Rights
The general rule is that the plaintiff must show actual injury
from the defendant's violation of a constitutionally protected right or
civil right before the plaintiff may recover damages.76 The Supreme
Court has generally rejected the extension of the presumed damages
concept into this area.77
7. Punitive Damages
The dominant rule in the United States is that a plaintiff must
demonstrate actual injury as a condition precedent to receiving an
73. FISCHER, supra note 27, § 105 ("'Special damages' are actual pecuniary losses, such as
loss of employment, that directly result from the defamatory statement."); PROSSER, supra note
40, § 112, at 760.
74. FISCHER, supra note 27, § 109 (noting that the approach taken by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which allows incurred attorneys fees to satisfy the special damages
requirement, has not been adopted by the courts).
75. Id. § 83.3; PROSSER, supra note 40, § 14, at 77.
76. FISCHER, supra note 27, § I11.
77. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986) (applying actual
damage requirement to substantive due process violation claims); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
264 (1978) (applying actual damage requirement to procedural due process violation claim).
There is some disagreement as to whether the above decisions encompass the universe of possible
claims. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 7.4(2); FISCHER, supra note 27, § 111, at 686-87 (noting
decisions that have read Stachura narrowly and have proceeded to permit presumed damages for
constitutional rights violation).
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award of punitive damages." The rationale for the requirement is
that absent actual injury, courts perceive an award of punitive
damages as a windfall to the plaintiff.79 That said, the jurisdictions
are often liberal in identifying the type of injury that satisfies the
requirement. 0
III. SOME OVERLAPPING THEMES
A. Tentative Observations
The prior collection of examples may appear to be a pastiche,
but I believe that view places too much emphasis on the situational
differences. For example, one might contend that in the case of
statutory remedies the difference between the decisions permitting
recovery of statutory damages without proof of actual injury and the
decisions denying recovery of statutory damages absent a showing of
actual injury, simply reflect differences in statutory language and
legislative history. Usually there are differences in the exact text of
the remedy language in the statute, and the legislative history often
reflects the different concerns that led to the enactment of separate
legislation.
That said, the argument that text and legislative history explain
the differences in results suffers from the fact that on the specific
point-whether an award of statutory damages requires proof of
actual injury-legislative history is silent and textual differences, as
Doe v. Chao and Kehoe evidence, prove less than illuminating.
What is significant is the vast difference in each court's approach to
the problem of statutory construction. Even accounting for the slight
78. Richard C. Tinney, Annotation, Sufficiency of Showing of Actual Damages to Support
Awards of Punitive Damages-Modern Cases, 40 A.L.R. 4TH 11, 18 (1985).
79. People Helpers Found., Inc. v. City of Richmond, Va., 12 F.3d 1321, 1327 (4th Cir.
1993).
80. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis. 1997) (permitting
recovery of punitive damages when only nominal damages were awarded for intentional trespass
to land that inflicted no actual harm to property but invaded owner's right of exclusive use); Pulla
v. Amoco Oil Co., 882 F. Supp. 836, 875 n.33 (S.D. Iowa 1994) (collecting decisions holding that
award of nominal damages will support an award of punitive damages), modified, 72 F.3d 648
(8th Cir. 1995). There is some disagreement as to the type of nominal damages that will support
an award of punitive damages. See Abner v. Kan. City S. R.R. Co., 513 F.3d 154, 158-60 (5th
Cir. 2008) (collecting decisions). Some jurisdictions state that only nominal damages awarded
due to measurement difficulties will support an award of punitive damages, but when nominal
damages are awarded simply because the plaintiff was a prevailing party, punitive damages may
not lie. Shell Oil Co. v. Parker, 291 A.2d 64, 71-72 (Md. 1972).
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variances in language used in each statute, in the end, the
dissimilarities in approaches generate the different results.8'
Some of the examples may reflect concerns with the right of
action itself. This concern may reflect disfavor with the action
itself5 2 or concern that the actual injury requirement is needed to
prevent overutilization of courts to resolve petty disputes.83 The
difficulty here is that these concerns are somewhat impressionistic.84
Judges do show a keen awareness of the link between caseloads and
remedies;85 on occasion, courts have specifically used that rationale
as a justification for affixing an actual injury requirement to the
cause of action.86 However, it is difficult to ascertain the importance
of the caseloads factor to the actual injury requirement.
81. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistent approaches in the
two decisions as to the same issue, whether statutory damages award is dependent on proof of
actual injury resulting from the statutory violation).
Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence to the denial of certiorari in Kehoe in which he
pointedly emphasized the substantial liability that the award of statutory damages could impose.
Kehoe v. Fid. Fed. Bank & Trust, 547 U.S. 1051, 1051 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). This
concern has also been voiced regarding Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act ("FACTA")
claims:
[T]his Court disagrees with some cases in the District Court for the Central District of
California, which have recently suggested that a class action is not a superior method
in FACTA cases because, where there is no evidence of actual harm and the minimum
statutory damage award would "destroy Defendant's business", the damage award
would be so disproportionate as to violate due process.
Klingensmith v. Max & Erma's Rest., No. 07-0318, Inc., 2007 WL 3118505 at *2 (W.D. Pa., Oct.
23, 2007) (citations omitted). For further discussion of FACTA claims, see supra notes 8 and 14.
82. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.9, at 257 (2d ed. 1993) ("Fraud
was a so-called 'disfavored action' at common law because it raised questions of defendant's
morality.").
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. e (1965); see also Zaslow v.
Kroenert, 176 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1946) (explaining that trespass to chattels involves less serious
interference with one's right to personal property than necessary to establish tort of conversion
(exercise of wrongful dominion and control over personal property).
84. For example, the adage that fraud actions are disfavored can be found in old and modem
cases; its use, however, is directed to justifying the special pleading rule, not the actual injury
rule. Jeff Sovern, Reconsidering Federal Civil Rule 9(b): Do We Need Particularized Pleading
Requirements in Fraud Cases, 104 F.R.D. 143, 144-45 (1985).
85. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 98 (1996);
Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal Courts:
A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871, 873
(1983); see also Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 434-36 (1997)
(discussing a number of potential claims that could inundate federal courts if NIED claim was
allowed based on fear of future disease).
86. FISCHER, supra note 27, § 112, at 696-97 ("Although the '[actual] injury' requirement
has been questioned and criticized as outmoded, many courts find that it serves as a necessary
counterweight to discourage frivolous litigation, particularly given the general refusal in this
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When the loss is derivative of some other injury, the law is more
tolerant in allowing a damage recovery without requiring proof of
actual injury regarding the derivative loss. For example, when a
victim sustains bodily injury, pain and suffering is recognized as a
component of the damages award in most jurisdictions as a matter of
course. 87  Contrast this with the situation where the claim, usually
now referred to as emotional distress, is asserted without an
associated claim of bodily injury. In this context, the availability of
damages is much more restricted. 8  This suggests that the actual
injury requirement serves as a gatekeeper, designed to allow
admission only to genuine claims.89
A related example of derivative loss is the recovery of loss of
use damages when personal property has been physically damaged or
destroyed. Even though the person with the right to use the property
may have suffered no actual "loss of use" injury from the damage to
the property-for example, because the property was not being used
and would not be used, or because there were available substitutes-
most jurisdictions still recognize a right to recover the hypothetical
loss as an actual loss.9" Actual injury to property creates a right to
recover damages for the derivative right to use because actual injury
is presumed from the primary loss.9' This allowance for loss of use
recoveries is, however, inconsistent with the application of the actual
injury rule in other contexts. When a third-party redresses the loss,
country to award a prevailing defendant his attorney's fees incurred in the successful defense.")
(footnote omitted).
87. Id. § 6.4 (noting general rule to treat pain and suffering as general damages rather than
special damages); id. § 73 (discussing elements and legal treatment of pain and suffering claim).
88. 2 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 7.2(6); FISCHER, supra note 27, § 12.1 (discussing how judicial
caution recognizes stand alone claims for recovery of economic distress).
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 cmt. b (1965) (expressing concern that
claims for emotional distress can be easily falsified). Whether the claims should receive
compensation is an altogether different matter. Compare Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering,
Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REv. 163, 164 (2004) ("[P]ain
and suffering damages cannot be justified in any thoughtful way when one unprepossessedly
considers such damages in the context of the goals of tort law. Pain and suffering damages and
the policy goals of modem tort law are conceptually and operationally incompatible."), with
David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 256, 271-72 (1989) (arguing that pain and suffering awards are justified under deterrence
criteria).
90. FISCHER, supra note 27, § 80.3 (discussing loss of use decisions).
91. At least this is the case with consumer users. The cases are divided in the context of
commercial users. See id.; see also PROSSER, supra note 40, § 14 (stating that in trespass to
chattels cases, loss of possession satisfies the actual injury requirement).
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some courts treat the redress provided by the third-party as cabining
the loss.92
Unlike the derivative-loss cases involving noneconomic loss, the
issue here does not appear to be tied to a concern over claim
validation, at least in the consumer context. Rather, the relaxation of
the actual injury requirement appears to be tied to an appreciation of
more fully compensating the victim for the loss. Perhaps there is
also a concern that not compensating for loss of use would lead to
under-deterrence, although that argument does not appear to have
been urged in court decisions or in remedies scholarship.93 It does,
however, explain decisions like Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.," in
which the court affirmed a $100,000 punitive damages award tied to
a one dollar nominal damages award.95 In that case, the defendant
sought and was denied permission to cross plaintiffs' property.96
Alternatives were expensive, so the defendant simply disregarded the
denial and trespassed.97 Even if the plaintiffs did not suffer any
actual harm, the deliberately wrongful conduct would not have been
meaningfully deterred by a one dollar award.98 This suggests that, at
92. For example, the cases when physicians accept discounted fees. See supra notes 51-52
and accompanying text.
93. Deterrence is a largely assumed consequence in most scholarly commentary. The
empirical literature is conflicting as to whether legal rules specifically influence (e.g., deter)
behavior. Cf Gary T. Schwartz, Realty in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law
Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 379 (1994) (concluding that an argument of some
moderate deterrent effect can be gleaned from the empirical data). Schwartz further notes that
even if a deterrent effect exists, the effect must be measurable, and this latter task is inherently
imprecise. Id. Professor Katyal comments:
Both torts and taxes are areas where the government attempts to price conduct in ways
that minimize certain distortions in behavior. The insights of substitution from these
areas of law suggest a rather different way of thinking about deterrence in criminal
law; instead of examining whether a penalty deters a particular activity, it is also
important to inquire about the cost of that deterrence. Just as torts analysts ask what
the price of strict liability is, and just as the tax wonks examine whether particular
changes to the tax code will change income-producing behavior, scholars and
policymakers might gain a fuller appreciation of the impact of deterrence through the
vehicle of substitution.
Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2401-02 (1997). For a
discussion of the literature in this field, see DON DEWEES, DAVID DUFF & MICHAEL
TREBILCOCK, EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY
(1996).
94. 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
95. Id. at 156.
96. Id. at 157.
97. Id.
98. The Steenberg Homes court further commented:
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the core, what is being protected in wrongful use cases like
Steenberg Homes is the bare legal right of freedom from invasion or
disruption by the defendant. By extension, the compensatory award
for loss of use validates the right and serves to deter rights violations
by imposing a real cost on the rights violator. This is true even when
the rights holder sustains no actual economic loss but the defendant's
wrongful conduct deprives the owner of the right to use the damaged
property.
Another way of manipulating the actual injury requirement is
through the characterization of loss, such as in the earlier
hypothetical in which the owner of personal property sustains
damage to the property that is aesthetic but not economic.99 Under
the dominant test, the owner's aesthetic and emotional interests in
the property are disregarded. When the injury to the property is
classified as aesthetic, the owner sustains no economic loss; she
sustains no actual injury, and her rightful position is not legally
affected by the claimed injury to her property.
Equating actual injury with economic loss advances a number of
values that traditionally have resonated well with courts. One value
is the avoidance of economic waste. Is it reasonable to expend
money to repair property when doing so does not add to its economic
value?' Consider the problem of the contractor's breach that does
not affect the fair market value of the finished product. Assume a
builder constructed a residence according to specifications, except
that the residence faces north instead of east. If the economic value
of the house is the same either way, has the buyer suffered an actual
[T]he individual has a strong interest in excluding trespassers from his or her land.
Although only nominal damages were awarded to the Jacques, Steenberg's intentional
trespass caused actual harm. We turn next to society's interest in protecting private
property from the intentional trespasser.
Society has an interest in punishing and deterring intentional trespassers beyond
that of protecting the interests of the individual landowner. Society has an interest in
preserving the integrity of the legal system. Private landowners should feel confident
that wrongdoers who trespass upon their land will be appropriately punished. When
landowners have confidence in the legal system, they are less likely to resort to "self-
help" remedies.
Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
99. See supra Part II.E. 1.
100. McKinney v. Christiana Cmty. Builders, 280 Cal. Rptr. 242, 245 (Ct. App. 1991)
("Courts normally will not award [damages] which exceed diminution in value because the basic
objective of compensatory damages is to make an injured party whole, but no more than that.")
(citiations omitted).
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injury? Should the buyer recover damages based on what it would
cost to rebuild the residence so that it faced east?' Should the
buyer be awarded a recovery measured by the cost of altering a
perfectly good residence and rebuilding it exactly as it should have
been constructed, except for the new orientation? There may be a
concern that allowing recoveries in these types of cases would
incentivize buyers to claim aesthetic injury to obtain concessions
from contractors. Is this concern enhanced by the absence of a
decline in market value due to the alleged improper orientation? If
the market does not value the east-facing as highly as the north-
facing orientation, does that mean that the buyer's claims are
subjective and unworthy of judicial recognition?
The actual injury requirement encourages some objectification
of the right that has been violated. Rights have value, but how does
one identify their value? Courts will have to determine legitimate
from illegitimate aesthetic values without a standard that permits
objective measurement. These difficult questions can be avoided by
limiting recovery to actual injury as measured by economic loss.
We might be more inclined to support aesthetic recoveries when
the parties clearly signal ex ante that aesthetic values are important.
For example, if a person enters into a contract to have his residence
built in the English Tudor style, a contractor who provides a French
Colonial structure has breached the essential point of the bargain.'
Similarly, some forms of property may have unique societal and
cultural values that justify recoveries that exceed diminution in
value. 3 However, this is an area where courts have been less than
101. This example is based on Grossman Holdings Ltd. v. Hourihan, 414 So. 2d 1037 (Fla.
1982).
102. See Lyon v. Belosky Constr., Inc., 669 N.Y.S.2d 400 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that cost
of replacement was the proper measure of damages). The court stated:
Plaintiffs contracted to build a custom home at significant expense which, in fact,
exceeded the fair market value of the home as completed per the drawings .... It is
clear from the record that the aesthetic appearance of the home, both inside and out,
was of utmost importance to plaintiffs. Our review of the photographs of the home as
constructed compared with the design drawings convinces us that plaintiffs did not get
the benefit of their bargain and that requiring defendants to remedy the problem would
not, under these particular circumstances, result in unreasonable economic waste.
Accordingly, we find that Supreme Court applied the appropriate measure of damages.
Id. at 401-02 (citation omitted).
103. See, e.g., Orndorffv. Christiana Cmty. Builders, 266 Cal. Rptr. 193, 195 (Ct. App. 1990)
(permitting homeowner to recover cost of repair damages even though cost of repair exceeded
home's diminution in value, as long as difference was not unreasonable). The court emphasized
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consistent."° The issue may be influenced by a governmental signal
as to how actual injury should be defined." 5
Adoption of a rule based on the avoidance of economic waste is
not costless. Defining actual injury in terms of economic loss may
operate to shift the risk of variance in bargain expectancy to the
plaintiff and away from the defendant. If that shift occurs, the
concern might legitimately be that the plaintiff may be saddled with
something that does not meet his expectations, but which has not
caused him to sustain any economic losses.
For example, in the context of the wrongly sited residence, the
buyer did not receive the benefit of the bargain, but the law provided
no remedy except to the extent the buyer could show that the breach
resulted in diminution of economic value. A contractor might
exploit this rule by cutting corners and costs in the knowledge that as
long as any contract breach does not affect the market value of the
performance (measured not by the cost of performance but by the
value of the product produced), the contractor does not face a
credible threat of liability for the breach. Not allowing the
nonbreaching party to recover damages for aesthetic changes or
omissions might encourage contractors to breach. If a concern over
encouraging buyer extortion lies behind the decision to limit buyers
to economic losses resulting from contractors' breaches, should we
not be equally concerned with a response that may encourage
contractors to cut comers?0 6
the importance of homeownership in American culture. Id.; see 3 DOBBS, supra note 5, §
12.19(1) (discussing greater than diminution in value recovery in the context of personal taste
contracts); FISCHER, supra note 27, § 90 (collecting decisions).
104. FISCHER, supra note 27, § 82 (discussing recoveries when pets are killed or injured as a
result of wrongdoing by another and noting dominant rule is to limit recovery to diminution in
economic value).
105. See Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 2007 MT 183, 46-47, 338 Mont. 259,
46-47, 165 P.3d 1079, 46-47 (stating that limiting landowners to market value recoveries
rather than greater restoration cost recoveries would enable defendants to exercise private right of
eminent domain).
106. When the breaching party profits from the breach, but the breach does not actually injure
the nonbreaching party, an action for unjust enrichment may lie to deter opportunistic breaches.
Earthinfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, Inc., 900 P.2d 113, 119 (Colo. 1995) (holding
that "mere breach" of contract would not permit restitution of gains obtained by breach, yet
commenting that when "the defendant's wrongdoing is intentional or substantial, or there are no
other means of measuring the wrongdoer's enrichment, recovery of profits may be granted");
Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, the "Restitution Interest, " and the Restatement of
Contracts, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2021, 2046-47 (2001) (suggesting that the remedy of disgorgement
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A different, but complementary, justification for the actual
injury requirement may be found in the distinction between property
rights and liability rules as developed by Calabresi and Melamed in a
highly influential Harvard Law Review article."7 Although the focus
of the article was somewhat different from that addressed here,' 8 the
property right/liability rule distinction illustrates some observed
differences in the application of the actual injury requirement.
Basically, if the interest is defined as a property right, the law allows
recovery of damages without a showing of actual injury. Otherwise,
the law is that if the interest is only protected by a liability rule,
actual injury may be required as a precondition to awarding
damages.
Assume the following:
Contractor uses an empty lot to store dirt while she
excavates on an adjoining lot. At the conclusion of the
work, Contractor removes the dirt and restores the lot to its
preexisting state. During the period the lot was used as a
fill site for the dirt, Owner was unaware of the use and no
plans or activities of Owner were thwarted by the
unauthorized use. Has Owner suffered an actual injury
such that he may recover damages for the unauthorized use
of the lot by Contractor?
Under the hypothetical facts, 9 Owner suffered no economic
loss in fact. Owner lost no opportunity to exploit his ownership
interest, nor was the land damaged in any way. Did Owner suffer
any actual injury under the circumstances? To say that the answer is
''no" is troubling.
The land was used without Owner's permission. To treat this as
not amounting to actual injury diminishes Owner's rights. Strangers
of benefits may be appropriate when needed to deter opportunistic breaches of contractual
obligations, despite a general opposition to that remedy).
107. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
108. The focus of the Calabresi and Melamed article was on entitlements. See supra note
107. If an entitlement was enshrined in a property right it could not be transferred without the
consent of the property right owner. An entitlement protected by a liability rule could be taken
without the entitlement owner's consent as long as fair compensation (i.e., damages) was paid for
the invasion of the entitlement. Id.
109. The hypothetical is based on Don v. Trojan Constr. Co., 2 Cal. Rptr. 626, (Cal. Ct. App.
1960). Note the parallel to Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997)
(discussed supra note 80 and text and notes 94-98).
Fall 2008]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:197
may use the land as long as Owner is not harmed regarding his plans
for the land or the land is not physically harmed. Such a rule would
substantially diminish what we commonly understand (and value) as
the right of a property owner to exclude unconsented uses.
Moreover, to say that Owner lost no opportunity to exploit his
ownership interest may be criticized because there was a loss in the
sense that Owner lost the ability to bargain with Contractor for the
use of the land. Contractor may contend that she had neither interest
nor intent to contract with Owner for the use of the lot, but that
misdirects us from the real issue. Should the law encourage or
require that contractors bargain with owners for the use of the latter's
property? If we accept that contractors should, that obligation would
be compromised unless bypassing bargaining was generally treated
as actual injury even if a particular owner suffered no economic
losses or injury to the property as a result of a particular contractor's
unauthorized use of the property." 0
Even if there is proof of actual attempts to bargain, unsuccessful
attempts are hardly a measure of what was lost. Unsuccessful
attempts at bargaining or no bargaining requires the court to
substitute its own views as to economic value for that of the parties.
If the contractor knows that the worst-case result is that he must pay
economic damages based on the use value of the property, this might
encourage strategic bargaining or no bargaining depending on the
likelihood of detection."' Limiting the award to actual economic
loss may not deter deliberate wrongful use of the property by non-
owners, such as Contractor in the hypothetical, or accurately
compensate Owner for the wrongful use."'
Because Owner has a legally recognized property interest, the
general approach is to permit him to recover damages without
requiring proof of actual injury.'13 This approach is, however,
110. This point distinguishes this problem from Metz v. Soares, 142 Cal. App. 4th 1250,
1257-58 (2006). In Metz the court held that mere loss of the abstract right to use would not
support a loss of use award. Id. In that context, however, the loss was inadvertent, not deliberate.
S11. One approach might be to use a multiplier based on the probability of detection, but
courts tend to adopt this approach only when the legislature specifically commands. Another
approach would be to permit punitive damages.
112. See Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 2007 MT 183, 46-47, 338 Mont. 259,
46-47, 165 P.3d 1079, 46-47 (noting judicial reluctance to allow private parties to exercise
power of eminent domain); see also supra text accompanying note 105.
113. Don v. Trojan Constr. Co., 2 Cal. Rptr. 626 (App. Ct. 1960). The RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS comments:
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usually limited to cases when there has been a deliberate physical
interference with the property right, such as dumping or the removal
of resources.114 When the interference is less invasive or non-
physical,1 5 a court may require actual injury as a condition to an
award of damages or limit the property owner/entitlement holder to
nominal damages." 6  On the other hand, if the property owner
contracts to allow his property to be used as a dump site and the
defendant breaches the contract by depositing more material than
authorized, the entitlement holder must show actual injury to recover
damages."7 The contract creates a liability, but it does not rise to the
level of a property right.
To illustrate and contrast property and liability rules, consider a
problem involving DVD rentals, which raises the question of the
actual injury requirement in bargain transactions. Bargain
transactions, like tort claims in general, require actual injury as a
necessary condition for the recovery of damages. While exceptions
The owner of the subject matter is entitled to recover as damages for the loss of the
value of the use, at least the rental value of the chattel or land during the period of
deprivation. This is true even though the owner in fact has suffered no harm through
the deprivation, as when he was not using the subject matter at the time or had a
substitute that he used without additional expense to him.
Id. § 931 cmt. b (1979).
114. See RESTATEMENT TORTS § 931, cmt. b (1939).
The owner of the [land] is entitled to recover as damages for the loss of the value of the
use, at least the rental value of the ... land during the period of deprivation. This is
true even though the owner in fact has suffered no harm through the deprivation, as
where he was not using the [land] at the time....
Id.
A takes possession and detains for six months B's land which has a rental value for the
period of$1000. B is entitled to receive this amount as damages although he never had
used and would not have used the land during such period.
Id. Illus. 1.
115. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colorado v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377 (Colo. 2001) (collecting
decisions regarding actual injury requirement when invasion of right involves "electronic
magnetic radiation"); cf H.E. Stevenson v. E.l. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 327 F.3d 400 (5th
Cir. 2003) (holding that, under Texas law, entry of airborne particulate matter onto the plaintiff's
property constituted a trespass, but the failure of the plaintiff to establish the pre-tort value of the
property precluded an award of damages based on diminution in value).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965). The actual injury requirement for
trespass is confined to cases when the substantiality of the trespass is in question as, for example,
the situations described in supra note 113. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 797
(Or. 1959).
117. FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, at § 12.9 (discussing the general requirement that recovery
of breach of contract damages is predicated on actual loss, although loss may be measured in
various ways); see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:197
to the actual injury requirement exist in tort, in transactions involving
disrupted bargains, where the disappointed party seeks to recover a
loss of expectancy or out-of-pocket loss, the actual injury
requirement is consistently applied."8 What losses does a store
sustain as a result of the patron's failure to return a DVD on time?" 9
The store does not sustain any direct out-of-pocket expense. The
number of DVDs purchased as stock-in-trade is independent of the
individual patron's actual conduct. The store may purchase
additional DVDs to cover anticipated delayed returns, but this is
done ex ante and not as a consequence of the patron's delayed return.
Nor does the store usually purchase DVDs to replace the DVD that is
rented but not returned by the patron. Even if it did, the rental price,
calculated by the usual rental period, would likely already absorb
these "costs." Any oversupply or undersupply of DVDs is the result
of a business decision as to the amount of stock to carry, not the
result of the particular patron's actions. Moreover, the store usually
does not lose any sales as a result of the patron's failure to timely
return the DVD. Of course, if the store can show an actual lost sale
due to the unavailability of the unreturned DVD, the situation is
different.
The store may claim an expectancy loss based on the bargain
with the patron. The patron agreed to pay the store for the time the
patron had the DVD. However, it is difficult to extend this
expectancy beyond the initial rental period. The patron's agreement
-to pay for periods beyond the initial rental period resembles an
agreed remedy provision, absent affirmative conduct by the patron to
re-rent the DVD. 2 °
118. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
119. This issue arose in Schlosser v. Welk, 550 N.E.2d 241 (111. App. Ct. 1990), which
involved overdue videotapes rented by a former employee. Schlosser differs from the given
hypothetical in that the videotapes were taken by an employee (who was terminated the same day
the videotapes were taken), permissibly, for the employee's personal use. Id. at 242. The
employee contended that she simply forgot to return the videotapes. Id. The court found that the
employee benefited from her possession of the videotapes even though she did not watch the
tapes. Id. at 243. The fact that she did not watch them, however, influenced the court's measure
of the benefit the former employee derived from her possession of the tapes. Id. The court
reduced the amount of damages awarded to the store to one day's rental fee for each tape, even
though the former employee possessed each tape for approximately two months. Id. The court
did not supply a reason for why one day's rental value was an appropriate measure of the benefit
received.
120. See supra Part ll.B. The situation may be recast as a wrongful retention of the store's
property (DVDs) by the patron. Even here, however, the store's ability to claim damages due to
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Some of the differences in the decisions regarding whether
actual injury is a condition to a damages award may reflect
worldview, policy-based disagreements over what it means to
compensate the plaintiff to restore her to her rightful position. This
viewpoint is illustrated in the decisions addressing whether the
plaintiff should be compensated'in pre-tax or post-tax dollars when
the award itself is exempt from tax recognition.
21
The post-tax measure of loss is supported by the argument that
post-tax dollars are what the plaintiff lost as a result of the
defendant's misconduct.12  Hence, post-tax dollars are what should
be awarded to restore the plaintiff to her rightful position.123 The pre-
tax dollar measure of loss is supported by the argument that taxation
is a collateral matter between the plaintiff and the government,
coupled with the concern that injecting tax calculations into the
award would be unduly speculative and conjectural.1
24
There is a strong correlation here between the advocates of pre-
tax and post-tax measures and the positions asserted in other contexts
where the plaintiff suffered an actual loss. The pre-tax measure that
damages should restore what was actually lost is similar to concerns
raised when third-party payments to the plaintiffs treating physician
remedy the plaintiffs loss 125 and when post-loss events nullify or
obviate the victim's loss.
26
wrongful retention may require that the store demonstrate actual injury because the invasion of
the property right is not usually seen as inherently sufficient to justify absolute protection. See
supra text accompanying note 75 for a discussion of the actual injury requirement in the context
of trespass to chattels.
121. E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2000) (excluding from gross income "the amount of any
damages ... received. . . on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness"); 2
DOBBS, supra note 5, § 8.6(4) (discussing effect of non-recognition of income for taxation on
calculation of personal injury damages).
122. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 493-94 (1980).
123. Id.
124. FISCHER, supra note 27, § 17.4. The concern over speculation and conjecture seems
somewhat specious given the already high level of "guestimation" that is used to calculate the
award. See id. § 9.3 (discussing assumptions used to calculate future loss and discount rate); see
also id. § 71.2 (discussing assumptions used to calculate loss of earning capacity).
125. See supra Part lI.E.2.
126. See supra Part II.E.3. The issue also arises in the liquidated damages area. Some courts
require that real world facts at the time of the breach confirm the subjective view of actual loss in
event of a breach, which the parties held at the time of contract formation. FISCHER, supra note
27, § 181.3. Under this view, it is not sufficient that the parties actually contemplated a loss if
there was a breach. The breach must actually result in a loss for the liquidated damages clause to
be enforceable. This requirement acts very much like an actual injury requirement, although it is
analytically distinct from the requirement.
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B. Tenative Suggestions
As suggested earlier, it is easier to collect examples in this area
than it is to find a common unifying theme that classifies and sorts
the cases into a coherent scheme. There is no taxonomy or lexicon
that addresses the actual injury requirement as a separate,
freestanding value. Rather, it appears more as a conclusion or
afterthought to other concerns, such as genuineness of the claim,
avoidance of economic waste, protection of property rights, etc.
Analysis is particularly difficult because the examples do not line up
and point in a specific direction. If they did, one could perhaps
identify an underlying worldview out of the decisions. Instead, the
decisions go back and forth and swirl like eddies, rather than flow
like currents. The application of the actual injury requirement is
highly contextual, although the contextual considerations must be
teased out of the decisions. Courts do not admit that context matters,
but there is no other way to read the decisions. Let me offer some
thoughts as to what may lie behind the disparate examples of the
applications of the actual injury rule.
First, the refusal to recognize or permit a damages award for
violation of a right absent a showing of actual injury does not
necessarily depict a disregard or marginalization of the right. Most
cases of rights violations result in actual injury. In many contexts,
the injury threshold is set sufficiently low.'27 It is the unusual case
that presents the clean, no actual injury profile.
Second, the larger concern that should drive analysis in this
context is not the presence or absence of actual injury, but the
consequence of requiring actual injury as a condition to protecting
the right. Put simply, the issue is whether individuals should be
allowed to violate a legal standard as long as the violation does not
cause actual economic harm to a specific individual protected by the
standard. Looked at from this vantage point, the incentives may
seem skewed, but I suggest that view may be mistaken. As noted
above, the likelihood that a rights violation would lead to no actual
injury is small.
127. For example, in the constitutional tort/civil rights context, the general rule is to allow the
victim to satisfy the actual injury requirement by demonstrating that the violation caused him
emotional distress. See supra text accompanying note 77. But cf Brandt v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi.,
480 F.3d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 2007) (suggesting that injuries resulting from being suspended from
school for a short duration of time "are minuscule to the point of nonexistent").
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More importantly, the converse situation (permitting a damages
recovery in the absence of actual injury) might create perverse
incentives. If a plaintiff could receive compensation for a rights
violation without establishing actual injury, this would tend to
monetize the value of the right. One policy consequence of this
might be that rights violations may increase whenever the benefit of
a rights violation is deemed to outweigh the cost of paying the
victim. This would, in effect, import the concept of efficient breach
into violations of rights."8 One remedial consequence might be the
loss of injunctive relief in this context. 9 At present, the absence of a
damages remedy supports the allowance of injunctive relief.
Moreover, success on the claim for injunctive relief allows the
prevailing plaintiff to recover attorney's fees. If, however, rights
violations can be monetized, the case for injunctive relief is
weakened because the legal remedy (damages) is no longer
inadequate relative to the equitable remedy (injunctive relief). 3 °
Ironically, permitting recovery of damages without a showing of
actual injury (monetizing the right) might cause the value of the
equitable remedy to depreciate. The concern is also expressed in the
judicial reluctance to permit a damages action to discourage certain
rights violations when the consequence of permitting a damages
recovery would commodify the right, such as allowing defendants
the right to expropriate private property by paying compensation.'
Third, in some cases, "slippery slope" concerns may caution
against redressing mere violations of law or legal duty. Imposing an
actual injury requirement and treating the "harm" as not satisfying
128. Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 957-58 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that there
is little evidence of general judicial enthusiasm for the project). Even Judge Posner, I believe,
would limit the intrusion of efficient breach principles into tort to those situations where the
underlying obligation is bargain-related. Judge Posner argues:
The law is not as clear as it could be in differentiating between "interferences" with
contract that result in an efficient breach and should therefore not be deemed a tort and
subjected to sanctions that would either prevent the efficient breach or require a
roundabout recontracting, and interferences that induce breaches that reduce efficiency.
Posner, supra note 38, at 744.
129. 1 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 2.5 (noting that the absence of a legal remedy is justification
for providing an equitable remedy); FISCHER, supra note 27, § 21.1.
130. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 107-108 and accompanying text. The aftermath of the Court's decision
in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), in which the Court refused to invalidate
public condemnation for private use, well illustrates both the intensity of the issue and the lack of
consensus as to its proper resolution.
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the requirement accomplishes that objective. For example, should a
defendant's decision to bypass an opportunity to bargain with the
plaintiff be treated as a divisible, actual injury?12  There may be
concern that treating the failure to bargain as an injury could lead to
identifying it as a wrong. That eventuality may cause courts to not
want to take the first step as they might have reasonable concerns
over the prospect of creating liability for the failure to bargain.
Courts may also be concerned with their ability to measure the harm
resulting from the failure to bargain. Is the harm any different from
the harm sustained by the underlying act? Should failure to bargain
be seen as separate from the primary wrong or as indivisible from the
primary harm? These concerns may encourage judicial caution that
expresses itself in non-recognition of a remedy or, if a rights
violation is recognized, in a non-damages remedy, such as
restitution.'
Ultimately, whether the actual injury requirement should be
jettisoned or retained becomes a case-specific inquiry: what values
will be advanced or retarded in this specific context if the actual
injury rule is applied? Thus, the diversity in the decisions is
expected, rather than surprising. One can, and does, encounter
overlaps because the key inquiry is the same: should actual injury be
required? The results vary, however, with the case. For example,
retention of the actual injury requirement may make sense in the
constitutional tort/civil rights context because we do not want to: (1)
diminish the right by monetizing it, (2) encourage violations based
on cost/benefit criteria,'34 or (3) undermine the availability of
injunctive relief to police respect for the right. These factors may
not, however, travel well when applied to the other contexts
discussed in this Article where the actual injury requirement is
considered and applied.
Let me present one last case to illustrate the difficulty in arriving
at a consistent approach to the question. In Franklin Medical
Associates v. Newark Public Schools,'35 the injured party was the
132. See supra notes 109-117 and accompanying text (discussing hypothetical of
unauthorized use of land).
133. FISCHER, supra note 27, §§ 41, 43, 85, 93.5, 94.5.
134. This is not suggesting that cost/benefit analysis is bad. Private cost/benefit calculations
may, however, vary from the public calculations that were made (at least in theory) when the
right was recognized.
135. 828 A.2d 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
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school system (Newark Public Schools) that entered into a health
maintenance contract with a third-party (Franklin Medical
Associates) (Franklin) to provide health care services to the school
system's employees.'36 As a result of bribes paid to one of the school
system's employees by Franklin, the school system's employees
were directed to Franklin for medical services.'37 The school system,
as the payor of the bills incurred by its employees, did not sustain an
actual injury because the treatment was medically proper and
consistent with the contract between the school system and its
employees. The court held, however, that the bribe did interfere with
the school system's right of loyalty arising out of its relationship
with its bribed employee.'38 The court held that on these facts the
school system could recover the amount of the bribe ($60,000) as
damages, notwithstanding the absence of actual injury.'39
The recovery of damages against the briber has not been without
controversy. 4 ° Ultimately, the decision to permit recovery rests on
the goal of deterrence, which is an often relied on, but hard to justify,
reason for a particular result. 4' Requiring the briber to pay the
amount of the bribe as damages raises the costs of the rights
violation. When the right is highly valued and when other remedies
are unlikely to effectively prevent violations,'42 a damages award
136. Id. at 970.
137. Id.
138. The court characterized the relationship as fiduciary. Id. at 975. While that may be a bit
of an overstatement, the point is not critical to the analysis.
139. Id. at 974.
140. In a typical case the bribe is paid to obtain a contract. Here courts often presume that the
bid was inflated as a result of the bribe; hence the bid taker was damaged as a result of the
overpayment. United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1532 (11 th Cir. 1988). Professor Dobbs
comments:
What damages can the victimized employer claim? When the victim is a buyer of the
briber's goods, it may be assumed that the briber would have sold at a lower price if he
had not had to pay the bribe. The idea is that the briber who gives 10% kickback to the
purchasing agent would just as soon give a 10% discount to the victim; or alternatively,
that if the briber expects to benefit by at least the amount of the bribe, he must be
inflicting an injury in the same degree.
2 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 10.6, at 699 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
141. See supra note 93 (noting difficulty in determining extent to which, if at all, legal rules
meaningfully deter).
142. While an action for unjust enrichment will lie against the bribee, establishing an action
for unjust enrichment is a difficult and time-consuming task. Even if the briber "benefits" from
the bribe-as, for example, by the wrongful direction of business to it-tying the benefit to the
bribe may be difficult. The briber's revenues or profits may bear no real relationship to the bribe;
rather, they are the product of the services provided. Disgorgement, even if available in a private
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may be seen as an appropriate method for deterring wrongdoing,'43 at
least in the abstract.
To summarize, the divergency in the cases regarding the
necessity of actual injury as a condition to an award of compensatory
damages may reflect concerns that accentuate or marginalize the
requirement. In the accentuate category are:
(1) a desire to discourage litigation;
(2) a concern over claim validity;
(3) a desire that parties signal their preferences ex ante
rather than ex post; and
(4) a desire to avoid economic waste.
In the marginalize category are:
(1) a desire to compensate more fully to ensure adequate
deterrence;
(2) a desire to allocate properly non-pecuniary
incentives to encourage respect for rights; and
(3) a desire to protect rights from unconsented to
invasions by encouraging bargaining.
IV. CONCLUSION
Richard Abel wrote recently on the placement and attention to
the subject of damages in the Torts curriculum. In doing so, he made
a comment that I found interesting in its relationship to the topic of
this Article:
The reason for not going into greater detail is suggested [by
Jaffe]. Professor Jaffe asserted that questions of liability
have "great doctrinal fascination" but that damage
questions "and particularly their magnitude ... do not lend
themselves so easily to discourse. Professors dismiss them
airily as matters of trial administration." The reason for the
different treatment is not so much a "judgment of relative
context, may appear to be disproportionate to the wrong. FISCHER, supra note 27, § 51. But cf
United States v. Rogan, 459 F. Supp. 2d 692, 726-27 (N.D. Il. 2006) (holding that the
government could recover false payments made pursuant to a kickback scheme because the
government would not have made any payments if it knew about the scheme).
143. Sometimes a court might achieve this result by presuming that the violation resulted in
injury. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 7.3(4), at 317-18 (suggesting that awards of statutory
damages for violation of privacy are the equivalent of presumed damages); see also supra notes
135-143 and accompanying text (discussing damages resulting from receiving a bribe).
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importance. . . as the relative adaptability of the subjects to
conceptualization."'
My suspicion is that a room of Remedies professors would not
share Jaffe's views and, of course, the Remedies professors would be
correct. Remedies, no more and no less than Torts, or any other law
subject for that matter, is on the surface a bundle of technical rules.
It is what lies beneath the rule that is important. What policies and
judgments go into the making and filling of the rules? What policies
and judgments go into the decision to recognize and apply the rule in
a particular instance or ignore the rule or choose between competing
rules? Is there a pattern to the interstices of the structure of rules
applicable to the problem? The actual injury requirement illustrates
these points. On the surface, the actual injury requirement is
commonplace. It is cited and used by courts in a variety of contexts
as I have attempted to demonstrate in this Article. Yet, beneath the
rule and its application lays a basic, inchoate question: should the
court encourage litigation respecting a claim that a right was violated
by allowing the victim to recover damages without showing that the
rights violation produced actual injury? The judicial response
appears to be "it depends." Given the diversity of applications of the
actual injury requirement and the differences in its applications, this
may be as close to a unifying theme as one can identify.
144. Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable, In Commeasurable, and
Inegalitarian (But Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 254 (2006) (quoting MARC.
A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS
431 (3d ed. 1983) (citations omitted).
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